In aviation, a little fear can be a good thing. A wary appreciation for what could go wrong makes for a safer pilot than brash cockiness in the cockpit. The key is not to let healthy fear become debilitating panic in the face of stress. Seized by overpowering fright, an impulsive pilot may overpower the one thing that could avert disaster—the more experienced pilot beside him.On June 8, 2006, a CFI-in-training and his instructor were killed when they failed to recover from an intentional spin. The accident airplane, a Cessna 152, showed no sign of mechanical failure and had been used earlier that day for spin training without incident. The student reportedly had a history of impulsive and panicked behavior during stressful situations, including locking his grip on the yoke and refusing to give up control of the airplane.The flight departed Phoenix Deer Valley Airport in Phoenix, Ariz., at about 2:45 p.m. The airplane proceeded northwest toward the local practice area, climbing to 6,100 feet msl. The 200-hour pilot, who held a commercial certificate, was enrolled in a multiengine CFI course that required spin training as part of the curriculum. The purpose of the instructional flight was to introduce the pilot to spins and practice spin-recovery procedures.Radar returns showed the aircraft completing several maneuvers that included short climbs followed by quick, 1,000-foot altitude losses, consistent with the instructor demonstrating spin entry and recovery for the student. At approximately 3:30 p.m., the Cessna climbed to 5,500 feet msl. Returns then showed the airplane plunging 2,100 feet in 20 seconds before disappearing completely from radar.The wreckage was discovered on the side of a hill near a golf course. Airframe deformation and ground scarring were consistent with the airplane striking the ground in a spin. Amid the debris, accident investigators discovered a kneeboard with a piece of notebook paper secured in its clip. A handwritten note on the paper included a list: “[1] aileron neutral; [2] throttle idle; [3] opposite rudder; [4] pitch down.” Investigators found no evidence of mechanical failure or other anomalies that would have contributed to the accident or prevented spin recovery.Interviews with students and instructors at the flight school helped piece together a probable cause for the accident. One instructor, who had flown with the accident pilot about 10 or 12 times, described the pilot’s skills as good within the training environment but lacking in situations “outside the box.” He recalled the student pilot acting impulsively on numerous occasions when a stressful situation was simulated, such as failing an engine or stalling the airplane. The student would stiffen on the controls, “seizing the yoke as if petrified.” During one flight, the instructor had to physically jab the student in the leg to get him to relinquish the controls. Another instructor described a similar experience with the same student.If the 230-pound male student had panicked during his first experience with spin recovery, it would have been next to impossible for the 100-pound female instructor to override his control inputs. The NTSB blamed the crash on the failure of both the flight instructor and student pilot to regain control of the airplane in a timely manner during an intentional spin maneuver, resulting in a collision with terrain.While only required for the CFI ticket, spin training can be a worthwhile experience for any pilot. Spin-training mishaps are extremely rare, and the Cessna 152’s safety record is among the best of any spin-certified aircraft, according to data in the AOPA Air Safety Foundation’s special report on stall/spin accidents. The report further notes that recognition and prevention are the most important aspects of spin training, given that more than 80 percent of stall/spin accidents occur when the aircraft is maneuvering less than 1,000 feet above the ground—an altitude that makes spin recovery unlikely.This accident also demonstrates the importance of a relaxed approach to flying. Stressful situations are inevitable. The key is to remain focused and calm when faced with the unexpected. That may be easier said than done, but pilots who survive in-flight emergencies consistently cite level-headedness and reliance on checklists or proven safety routines as critical to their success. Unfortunately, those who succumb to panic and seize at the controls frequently encounter tragedy—the literal implications of a death grip.
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The longer we fly the more experienced we become, right? In some areas this is true but it seems that in the area of preflight it is easy to become complacent. I lecture on proper preflight during AF 260 and relate several, some amusing, stories to students about things I have seen or read about preflight. Have you ever left the chocks in after a fuel stop? I saw an aircraft jump the chocks one time at PAH, not good. I pass a picture around in class of a Piper with the tow bar still attached in the nose gear in flight. Perhaps the best, or worst, is the one where two pilots are going to fly an aircraft and during the takeoff roll the aircraft will not rotate, they pull harder and still the plane will not leave the ground. Finally, they try to abort the takeoff and run off the runway and thru a fence, luckily no one is hurt. The cause? The elevator had been removed for service. While these stories are somewhat humorous they can also be educational. It is easy to let things slide when doing a preflight. We tend to fall into the mindset that the airplane was ok the last dozen times we flew it must be ok now? Or, the airplane just flew what can be wrong? This type of thinking can lead to problems. Most recently I allowed this type of decision making process to occur and the results were not good
A student and I were on an x-country and had stopped for fuel. The student had remained on the ramp during the re-fueling and observed the lineman. He then paid for the fuel and we prepared to depart. I assumed he had checked the fuel and boarded the aircraft. The student then asked me if he needed to do a preflight. This is where the alarm bells should have gone off. Instead of having him do a check, I asked if he had seen the fuel caps replaced. He said yes. We taxied out and departed for MDH. The problem was the left fuel cap had not been replaced properly by the line personnel and fell off on the ramp, where it was found by the lineman. They reported this to the control tower who called departure who contacted center who called us about ENL. A little far to return to pick it up. We were not showing any signs of fuel loss. So not sure it was really our cap, we continued to MDH. Upon landing the left fuel cap was gone. The FBO was good enough to mail the cap back and there were no other problems.
This demonstrated how a minor oversight in the preflight can cause potentially serious problems. We could have exhausted our fuel supply on a longer trip. Nothing should be assumed during the preflight, ALWAYS check whenever fuel or any service is obtained. Check to see if any damage has occurred and remember to pull the chocks.
Submitted by Dave Kampe
Recently, there have been some instructions from tower to students to perform a low approach. In a couple of instances the students were not sure what that meant. I would encourage everyone to review with your instructor what it means to perform a low approach and possible scenarios of when ATC may issue a low approach.
Please be familiar with the AIM’s definition of a low approach.
LOW APPROACH – An approach over an airport or runway following an instrument approach or a VFR approach including the go-around maneuver where the pilot intentionally does not make contact with the runway.
In the latest issue of the Federal Air Surgeon’s Medical Bulletin, Dr. Warren Silberman explains a new policy that the FAA has implemented regarding how pilot DUIs are handled. In the past, a first offense DUI, if reported correctly and expeditiously, did not generally draw any negative attention from the FAA. At the time of the next flight physical, the DUI would be reported on the 8500-8 and the AME would be responsible for determining that there was no substance abuse problem before issuing the medical certificate.
The new policy, according to the article, is “if the airman had a blood alcohol level of greater than or equal to 0.15 or a positive alcohol test,……[or] if the airman refused to allow the police to take a sample”, then the AME is required to defer the medical certification paperwork to the FAA. The FAA “will then insist that the airman obtain a substance abuse evaluation from a recognized counselor as a condition of further consideration of issuance of a medical certificate.” So if certain conditions are met, that first DUI is no longer the ‘freebie’ it once was.
Please remember that any arrest, conviction or administrative action (e.g., suspension of drivers license, etc.) related to the operation of a motor vehicle while impaired is a reportable offense, according to the FAA. When the FAA accesses the National Driver Registry upon receipt of the medical certificate application, any ‘hit’ will generate a check of the airman’s medical records to check compliance with FAR 61.15(e). If the airman is not compliant, a suspension of pilot and medical certificates may result.
Your best bet is to not even let this happen in the first place. Be smart about drugs, alcohol and medications. And be honest on your paperwork!
Submitted by Lorelei Ruiz
